Since March 2004, when Rodríguez Zapatero first came to power, his goal, more than that of the government, has been to change the political regime of Spain. Spaniards voted this past Sunday, and the Popular Party (PP) improved their results from 2004, increasing their liberal-conservative representation. They are now dealing with a somewhat happy defeat, but a defeat nonetheless. There is plenty of time for analysis on the election itself; however, we must immediately look to the effects rather than the causes. What will happen in a Spain whose citizens have supported the deterioration of its Constitution, a pact with ETA and the Spanish hara-kiri economy?

 

The biggest political problem which Spain suffers, is the existence of the anomaly of an asymmetrical culture. When the Left came to power it did so with a profound ideological goal. It was determined to take any necessary action, legal or illegal to achieve this goal. The project of Zapatero, simpleton and suicidal for the nation, continues to be a project of deep and total reform for Spanish society. Zapatero has been the cause of many problems and there will undoubtedly be more to come. His political presence, however, is the consequence of a historic situation of even greater significance. The Left has created a level playing field on which it can promote agitation, propaganda, and instruction. To this, it has dedicated the past four years and will continue to do so in the future.

 

The same opportunity does not exist for the Right. In the name of coexistence and moderation, the PP has never touched on the fundamental topics, necessary for the formation of long-term voter conscience: Ethics, culture, sexuality, religion, and the “rights”. Never have they offered an alternative to the major topics of the Left. They don’t propose any great alternatives to the gay/lesbian issue, the death penalty, de-christianization, nor the historic hatred of Spain or the manipulation of the civil war. If anyone thinks that appealing to a “common sentiment” or the pockets of Spaniards over a period of three weeks will solve the problem, the result of defeat is justified.

 

Every time PSOE has governed, society has turned to the left, and every time PP leaves office, in the best of cases, things remain as they are. The Right has not lost the elections in this campaign, but somewhere in the last thirty years, including the last eight in which they governed well with administrative tasks, but failed in the areas of teaching political and cultural education. Zapatero has only started his social project where González left off, and no one thought to create opposition.

 

With this movement of the Left away from society to focus solely on administrative management, the Spanish political Right will have more and more difficulty winning an election in the future. If it does win, it will have to turn slightly more leftist in its policies. If it refuses to propose an alternative culture to that of the socialist ideology, it will continue to lose elections and eventually, liberalism. Today, the defeat is not hopeless. There still remains hope for PP, on the condition that it restores its principles which appear to have been forgotten. Another condition is that it must not avoid the ideological and cultural confrontation it has been ignoring for quite a while.

 

There are also two phenomena which must be reviewed. In the first place, in spite of the existence of liberal-conservative counterpolitics, millions of Spaniards have given their vote to the Popular Party. The existence of this formidable social base signifies the possibility of a real and antagonistic alternative, not only to Zapatero’s project, but to the left in general.

 

Secondly, the last few years have brought about a civil liberal-conservative appearance. This has been shown in newspapers, editorials, radios, some television, and various organizations and has created the civic response to Zapatero. This will not disappear, and now all the fury of the “infinite anxiety of peace” will fall on them.

 

The Popular Party must count on these two powerful forces if it wants to move forward in the next four years to expel Zapatero and try to fix the outrage he will undoubtedly provoke in this legislative term. It will mainly have to propose a political culture, not only alternative but antagonistic to the Socialists. If it fails to do this, it will only aggravate the problem.