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The Shipwrecked Admiral
Commentary nº 922   |  March 25, 2008
 
(Published in ABC, March 14, 2008)
 
Admiral Fallon resigned from his role as head of Central Command of the North American forces. In doing so, he has begun to right some wrongdoings. He has repeatedly and publicly distanced himself from the official actions of the U.S. Government which he serves.
 
Now President Bush is criticized, for being closed-minded to opinions different from his own. This is not only false, but is not the problem at hand. Fallon recognizes his right to give his opinion. He can speak freely to the president and before Congress. However he has a right to express his opinions through these proper channels in concrete circumstances, not in front of the press and television.
 
For much less, the Spanish ministers, José Bono and José Antonio Alonso resigned as chiefs of state, but were praised as defenders of military political power.
 
Everyone can understand that when there is not perfect understanding between members, a team cannot function. Keeping this in mind, in this case, it is obvious that the subordinate, Fallon, is the one obligated to leave the scene.
 
The strategy of the white house regarding Iran is to force a diplomatic exit, but before the ayatolás. The use of the force must always be an option. There is no effective “soft power” without “hard power”.
 
At the end of last year, Admiral Fallon of CentComm, began discussing and publicly criticizing this strategy. He denounced the noise of military drums. Even without putting his good faith in doubt, his actions were unacceptable. He was not the president, nor was he in a position to limit the options of the commander-in-chief. He should have been working to make all options as viable as possible.
 
Has his resignation made an attack on Iran more probable? At the moment what he has made probable is that the Pentagon will be able to perfect its operative plans with significantly less friction among its members. In any case, to attack or not to attack will depend more on what he does or doesn’t do regarding Iran. It will be his last responsibility.

 
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