(Published in ABC on April 5, 2008)
The existence of two conditions is imperative for the survival of any military alliance: its members must have the same perception of the threat, and they must share a common strategy for fighting it. The Atlantic Alliance is without a doubt the most successful in history. It is a formidable work of political and military engineers. It does not however meet either of the two aforementioned conditions. Years ago, it stopped being a “system of collective security” and became a security forum and agency of military services. This situation worries everyone involved and the efforts to revitalize the Organization are clear, especially those of its Secretary General. However, the differences which continue to prevail and with the passage of time, its decline is becoming more and more evident.
The idea in Bucharest to approve the writing of a new official strategy – the current one was written before September 11th – has been abandoned for a new less ambitious one. They turned to a “Declaration regarding the Security of the Alliance,” combined with the “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” which was approved in the Riga Summit. They tried to adapt the Alliance to a new security environment but failed to face, what for now seems like the impossible work of agreeing on a new, clear strategy.
The Alliance is at war in a distant country. The evolution of the conflict does not serve our interests well. Even thought the enemy is not strong, the design of the operation has so many weak points that the Taliban forces are increasing their sphere of influence considerably. They don’t win wars, but they do win clans, towns and men. As if they were in a Groucho Marx film, not all states sent troops. Some, such as Spain, have decided unilaterally to deny the existence of a war there. They keep their troops quartered for as long as possible and say they are working on reconstruction. Others contrastingly, are at the front line putting their men’s lives at risk and trying to contain the Islamists’ raids. Is it possible to maintain an alliance without a common enemy, strategy or solidarity? For now, the increase in troops approved by the US and France balances the situation. However, the serious criticism and threats made by Canada and Australia do not take the place of the internal tension. Rumsfeld’s warnings are becoming a reality. He predicted that in the future “voluntary alliances” would take the place of NATO. In Afghanistan, countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Korea contribute in one way or another to the common effort, more for the North American leadership than for the Alliance itself.
The French decision to increase its number of troops is of great significance which we can only appreciate for its conjunction with the political renewal of security. After trying to break the transatlantic link, President Chirac, finally realized the need to rebuild France’s relationship with the US. The reasons for this were as much for avoiding falling into the hands of the Russians, whose authoritarianism scared Chirac, as for an attempt to cover any evidence of French limitations. The future of France will include European leadership and a new strategic relationship with the United States. Keeping this in mind, full reintegration with NATO makes perfect sense, but only as part of the most complex operation for the development of European defence, scheduled for the next French presidency, and the structural link with NATO itself.
Sarkozy’s imagination continues to run free, to the horror of the most notable Gaullists, who fail to understand or believe in the proposed maneuver. The British government has not approved of the idea because it sees it as an attempt to weaken the Alliance in order to seek a new European defence, which it does not believe in. It would put the transatlantic linkage in danger of going up in smoke. On the contrary, the United States feels it has promise. In Washington, years ago, they “discounted” that the alliance wasn’t anything more than a security club, and supported any initiative reinforcing the French compromise and European abilities. What they do not want to say is that they are starting to believe in Sarkozy’s proposal.
The most recent enlargement has been the topic receiving the most discussion. They approved an end to negotiations regarding the addition of Croatia and Albania and have left hanging the case of Macedonia. They are waiting for a definitive agreement with Greece, which has doubts regarding their official denomination. Little by little, the Balkan states are being incorporated into the Alliance, which undoubtedly will be beneficial for regional security.
A much more delicate subject has been that of the Ukraine and Georgia who only aspire to be accepted as candidates. The answer has been ambiguous. They have recognized their right to be candidates, which would theoretically imply that the Alliance is ready to expand as far as the Russian border. However, previous negotiations prevail which creates a problem. Russia has demanded they deny the application. It wants to restrain the extension of NATO near its borders and aspires to establish a buffer or security block of neutral states. The threats have been clear, and its blackmail with Georgia is evident. The Russian order to recognize the segregation of the Georgian territories of Abjacia and Southern Ossetia, in light of the crisis created by the independence of Kosovo, supposes that if Georgia is accepted as an ally, the Organization will meet a serious dispute over frontiers with Moscow. This is partially because of the activation of the 5th article of the Treaty of Washington. The Same objection is created by the entry of Iraq.
France and Germany worry about Russia, a complicated and powerful neighbor, as well as a major supplier of essential energy resources to the Old Continent. They are horrified by the blackmail being carried out by Moscow, but don’t feel a necessity to expand the alliance nor do they want to create new problems. They try to pacify the Russian bear, ceding the Ukrainian and Georgian parts. For this reason, with the official language, the difficulties facing the process are more present in Berlin and Paris than other parts of these two countries. In this case, they are determined to face Washington and London, contrary to the intent of pacification and defence of Ukrainian and Georgian rights. The memory of Czechoslovakia is ever-present.
The Iranian threat, with their ballistic missiles and nuclear program, has been another fundamental topic for discussion. The European Union first attempted to convince the Tehran government to abandon their nuclear aspirations without threatening the use of force. Since this pacifist diplomacy failed, the Europeans turned to their old and sophisticated trickery. Now Europe not only recognizes the necessity of a counter-ballistic missile system, the well-known “Star Wars” of Reagan, but approved deployment in the Old Continent to develop national and regional systems. They face Iran with neither diplomacy nor dissuasion, but only under the wing of the protective Yankee mother hen. Russia has begun to show its contempt with its usual forcefulness. It says it feels threatened. This is not the case. The Russians are reacting to the increasing dependence of the old popular republics on the United States. When the NATO crisis became more evident, when they felt the moment had come to exercise their influence on Europe, they reinforced the link with the great American power. The Europeans are cowards, but not idiots. Russia is partly responsible with their harsh threats, of pushing these older, decadent nations into the arms of the United States who, even more, permits us to vent our frustrations and adolescent criticism without much consequence.