When we review the last Lebanese War and the region’s uncertain future, one of the first things that come to mind is to link the 34 days intervention with the rise of Pan-Islamism. Hezbollah made efforts to attribute to itself the victory that they should have thanked to third parties, and they did so in order to promote their authority within the Muslim World. It is a fact that the stability in the region was not achieved, in spite of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the arrival of Finul troops; both actions contained in Resolution 1701 of the UN Security Council. Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of the Party of Allah, feels stronger than ever and his leadership does not serve security, but the exact opposite. A proof of the aforesaid is the pressure that exerts on the government of Fuad Sinoura. Hezbollah is a modern organization, which knows well the obscure power of propaganda. They knew that exaggerating and spreading the postwar euphoria they will attract new believers to the cause and will be able to extend their control, they bet on becoming a winning horse.

 

Hassan Nasrallah is to Pan-Islamism what Gamal Abd-Nasser was to Pan-Arabism. His Islamic argument refers to religion as the neuralgic nucleus of the national identity and in this manner nourishes the pride of being a part of the mentioned identity. Those that think that the issue is -exclusively- a patriotic struggle for liberation should feel disappointed, because Hezbollah’s rhetoric machine-gun describes a transnational and totalitarian project, the project of the Islamic Nation. Hassan Nasrallah specified it on July 16th, in one of the speeches transmitted by Al-Manar, the channel owned by the terrorist organization and the main window of their ideology.

 

 

Nasrallah addresses the audience directly, in order to encourage them to participate in that sacred mission. From a modern point of view, Pan-Islamism runs into the strategy of terror in order to achieve the historic recuperation of Dar-al-Islam, the territories of Islam’s Golden Age. Hezbollah emerges in 1982, coinciding with the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon. The Islamist movement is constituted around a double objective: the resistance against the occupier and the promotion of the Islamic republic in a country with a majority of Christians. Hezbollah cannot be understood without the victory of the Ayatollahs in Iran three years earlier. Soon enough, thanks to the landing in Lebanon of the guardians of the Iranian revolution, became the dominant force in Southern Lebanon and, in the course of time, started to gulp down the feeble state, unable to overcome a religious and fratricide war in spite of the democratic aspirations of the people. Hezbollah was established as a cruel and bloodthirsty militia. It is not in vain that among the militia’s main product was the introduction of the most abject explosive: the suicide bomber. It was November 1982, when the first suicide bomber exploded against an Israeli post. In April of the next year they attacked the USA Embassy and in October they blew up the barracks of the American forces and multinational observers (MFO), and killed 241 officers.

 

On August 14th, the first day of the cease of fire, Hassan Nasrallah was determined to sell the withdrawal of the Israeli troops as “a strategic and historic victory”, not only for the resistance but for “Lebanon —all of Lebanon—“ and “for the entire Islamic nation”. He wishes to appear as the sole victor. He knows that the extent of the success is correlative to the respect that he gains and to the penetration of his message. Nobody can argue about the ability of Hassan Nasrallah as a mass communicator and agitator. Al - Manar TV is his main asset. With his grandiloquent propaganda transmitted by TV, he empties the morale of the “other side” at the same time that inflates the mood of his own people. He reinforces his men in order to try and belittle his rivals. And he does so because he is conscious that currently he is unable to defeat Israel, from the military point of view, but he can do it from the morale aspect. The key is to capitalize his victory and to demoralize the Zionist army.

 

“(…) But losses that are more important are in the trust, the morale and in the way the people of this entity views its leadership, its  “invincible” army, its “great” security agencies, and their ability to confront a people small in numbers, a country small in size and capabilities, and popular resistance, which has limited material and human capabilities, but which is solid in determination and faith”. (Nasrallah, July 29, 2006, Al- Manar TV).

 

Leaders of the Islamic world, as the Egyptian Mohamed Mahdi Akef, President and spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, or his fellow townsman Mustafa Bakiri, fell prey to this “game”. Mentioning the apparent weakness of Olmert’s government at the conclusion of the military campaign, without achieving any of their objectives (liberation of the two soldiers and disarmament of Hezbollah), both Muslim leaders didn’t hesitate to glorify the figure of the Secretary General of the Party of Allah. Excited by the Israeli withdrawal, Bakiri, a Member of Parliament in Cairo, entitled Nasrallah as “the leader of the Islamic nation” and compared him to huge figures such as Gamal Abd-Nasser. Akef, identified as one of the organizers of this summer’s manifestations in favor of the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance, sees in Hezbollah’s struggle a model to be followed by the other Islamic organizations.

 

Also the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the most important patron of Hezbollah, was unable to abstain from celebrating the fortunate achievements of the Shiite militia. But Ahmadineyad did it in a different way from all the other: from the distance, as someone that moves the strings in a puppet theatre. As usual, the Iranian “prime minister” delineated the tug of war: a divine struggle between God and Satan,  which result depends on the participation of “all” the members of the Islamic nation. In the battle for the glory of Islam, nothing is forbidden. On August 2, the news association of Iran retransmitted the raving speech of the President:

 

 

These words are another example of the real threat, associated to the government of Ahmadineyad, for the existence of Israel; as well as of the internationalist will of the Islamic movement. Those that consider this as a regional conflict created by the mistrust provoked by Israel’s foreign policy should pay attention. This conflict is deeper and strikes roots in the feeling of despair provoked by the failure of the Arab-nationalist governments. It is the new alternative and in the meanwhile, the only solid one. The hatred distilled by the alliance promoted by Iran with the consent and participation of leaders such as Hugo Chavez or Raul Castro, does not focus only on the Hebrew state but extends to North America and continues to other actors “suspected” to be allies of the American “ogre”.

 

The four sided contacts among Venezuela, Iran, Syria and Cuba intensified during the last months. For the optimistic anti-Americans, the constitution of this “anti-imperialist coalition” is a healthy alternative to USA’s world hegemony; for the pessimists the explosive combination of the ego-paranoid behaviour of Chavez and Ahmadineyad’s fundamentalism does not predict anything good. They are not rational performers, from whom it is possible to expect measured and coherent attitudes. The multiple and known ideological differences between these two leaders are smoothed by their common hatred against their “common enemy” and by their will to establish a “new world order”, in which Israel will be caught in the bottom of the ocean. What would happen if such a thing takes place? How these events would influence us? These are questions that should alarm the western public opinion.

 

The terrible aspect of Pan-Islamism is that is not spread only by the international chiefs of the political Islam, but that descends from the offices and propagates through the streets of Iran, Egypt, South Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, Malaysia or Philippines. The Islamic fundamentalism is the sticky ideology of modern times. Young students in Iran, seduced by their leaders’ propaganda and by the arguments that focus in the division between heroes and infidels, created the group “Justice Movement of Students” in order to gather volunteers for the struggle against Israel. Lebanon is “armed with the weapon of faith” they assured in an interview transmitted last July 26 by Al Manar TV. Sali Tqvil, one of the volunteers and future computer engineer said: “We love martyrdom, and  are ready to go to Lebanon and to Palestine, to help the resistance, whether by giving it aid or even by martyrdom”.

 

In Egypt, on August 4th, a group of artists demonstrated publicly against the conflict. The lyrics of the song said: “resist, resist, resist. (…) Attack Haifa and Tel Aviv, dear Nasrallah. (…) if the martyrs of Palestine are terrorists, if Hizbullah are terrorist, if any resistance is terrorism, I scream at the top of my lungs: I am a terrorist”.

 

It is possible to bring more and more examples from Pan-Islamism, from the romantic view about terrorism that is spreading through the Middle East, before, during and mainly after the conflict. A sentimentalism that is also contaminates European judgment. The Islamic nation is turning into a talisman of Islamic politicians and strategists in order to gather the heterogeneous, and even opposed streams in Islam such as Shiites and Sunnite, and to unite them in the fight against Western domination. Israel, by representing the triumph of democratic values and the basic liberties in the region, turns to be the most inconvenient reality for the fulfillment of their dream.

 

 

The War of Lebanon also meant a double strategic move for the political-terrorist organization. With Israel’s withdrew from the land of cedars -during 2000- and UN Resolution 1559 demanding the disarmament of Hezbollah, the organization steps into a deep existential crisis. The Shiite militia needs to shake the Hebrew ghost in order to justify, both internally and externally, that they keep their combat equipment and capabilities. With the departure of Israel, their auto-definition as a resistance movement vanishes. They found themselves obligated to abandon the military path and join politics. To renew the conflict, among many other obscure reasons, was a matter of survival. They knew that by doing so they were able to get the legitimacy from part of the international community, and some voices would show complicity with the organization and their struggle against the Zionist enemy. The disarmament ultimatum vanishes. Hezbollah wins.

 

Iran, unofficial sponsor of the Shiite militia, is unable to detach from the analysis. Immerse in the program for Uranium enrichment, the Ayatollah’s republic emerges as a nightmare. The naïves have confidence that the bomb will serve as an element for diplomatic dissuasion; the realistic ones -among which are the neighboring countries- do not share the mentioned optimism. Furthermore, Ahmadineyad is conscious of the distrust caused in the region by his nuclear program, and reanimates the Lebanese conflict in order to show Israel as the “great enemy” of the Muslim world. Notwithstanding, the Muslim powers continued to demand the dismantling of the Lebanese militia, and made more evident the suspicions arisen by Iran in the region. You think differently when the threat hides next door. Europe should also take cognizance of that.

 

 In this situation, Lebanon is once again the test zone of the Iranian military might, the place where the regime of the ayatollahs evaluates its adversaries and through which resolves its problems. Eventually, thanks to the 34 days war, Iran manages to divert the attention of the international community.

 

 

If we examine the arguments of Hezbollah in order to justify the apprehension of the soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, it is possible to find contradictory elements. On July 26, Hassan Nasrallah boasted that hit the Zionist enemy for assuring that with the intervention “frustrated a dangerous plan and worse scenario of the war against Lebanon, against the resistance of Lebanon and against the people of Lebanon”. An act was foreseen, according to his words, for “September or October”. Later, yet, tries to qualify his words, and says that the abduction of the Israeli officers was “involuntary”. It is clear that he lies in one of these two statements. The frustration of the enemy’s offensive cannot be done spontaneously.

 

In fact, in Israel, from the first moment was believed that this was a “planned’ assault. Persons close to the government assured that it “was not possible to prepare within twenty four hours” the deployment of the militia for war. It is difficult to accept the naivety expressed by the Shiite militia’s Secretary General, when the Israeli government sent numerous warnings. In 2004, during the emotional funeral of the mortal remains of three soldiers extradited by Hezbollah in the last prisoners’ exchange, Ariel Sharon said: “Israel will not permit the kidnapping of soldiers” and in the event that there is a kidnap “we will have the means to prevent it and will not doubt to use them”. During the first half of 2006 were launched 598 “Qassam rockets” from the Gaza Strip. Isn’t this a provocation?

 

Returning to Hezbollah’s contradictions, Nasrallah’s revenge can be understood only from the viewpoint of a post-war strategy; as a desperate attempt to present Israel as the “main aggressor” in the region. In view of an eventual protest from Lebanese society, due to the many dead people and the destruction produced by the war, Hezbollah needs to protect himself and attribute the exclusive responsibility of the tug of war to Israel.

 

 

They share with the fatherland (Iran) the obsession to attack the Zionist enemy by surprise and to use non conventional methods. Military voices from Iran recognize this fact. On August 17th, three days after the celebrated cease of fire, generals from the army of the Islamic regime showed their belligerent attitude during a meeting transmitted by Channel 2 of the Iranian TV. They explained the changes in the nature of the war and revealed the key in order to achieve victory. Their attacks will not be any more due to “acts of war”, they said, but will be “by surprise” using “non conventional” methods. They detailed, also, the transformation of the army and the acquisition of new weaponry, including guided missiles, torpedoes and mines.

 

 

Just after that, he adopts the “surprise effect” strategy, in order to prevent the interception of the missiles. Reading these declarations, we understand why the most constant obsession in Israel is “to guarantee survival”.

 

The defiant tone of the disclosures helps to understand the massive support of Israeli society to the intervention in Southern Lebanon. Public opinion leaders, politicians and former politicians, professionals, doctors, taxi drivers or inhabitants of Mukelele, a settlement fenced by the West Bank fence, support their country’s right to defend itself. They understood that this was not a war by choice, but a war “forced” by the neighbors’ aggression.

 

Notwithstanding, the support answered to diverse reasons. Some people believed that the Israeli offensive would help to fortify the government’s image within and outside their frontiers, to recover their credibility as a regional power and after achieving this, to drive forward a new peace process in order to put an end to the conflict with the Palestinians, a focus, according to them, for the regional instability. Other, on the contrary, were sorry that Gaza was not attacked after the first Qassam and considered that Israel was the only preoccupied international party ready to guard its national security.

 

 

The conclusion is the regrettable thick smell of war that left the conflict in Lebanon. The “triumphal” exit of Hezbolla was an oxygen tank for the terrorist organization and for those that feel they are represented in their struggle. We shouldn’t forget that the 34 days conflict included in one single front the tandem Hezbollah – Hammas. As happened in 2000, Hammas feels reinforced by the “victory” of the political-terrorist organization over the “most powerful” army in the region and does not seem willing to turn towards peace, rather the contrary. Therefore, the authorities of Hammas refuse to free the Israeli youngster Gilad Shalit, reason that originated the conflict in Gaza first, and then in Lebanon. Probably in the offices in Ramallah they ask themselves why to do it now, if it was not indispensable in order to sign the cease of fire in the North?

 

Hezbollah’s influence on the Islamic resistance movement Hammas is tangible, not only in the strategy (Hezbollah also keeps two kidnapped soldiers) but also in the adaptation of the structure and the symbols. This is a role model and feels the responsibility of their disciple’s triumph over the “occupier”. In 1992, after years of previous contacts, Hezbollah became the supplier of weapons for Hammas and also its military instructor. It is not by chance that when the 415 deported Islamic militants returned to Southern Lebanon at the end of the same year, took place the first suicide attack in Palestine. Nevertheless, the main closeness between Hammas and Hezbollah is ideological. Facing the Arab nationalism, both organizations propose a religious alternative and place Islam as a key factor for the national construction.

 

It is not by chance that months after the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon (2000) started the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Maybe they tried to follow the same script. Missiles, mortars and Qassams introduced through underground tunnels from Egypt, fall in the southern regions. Restrained in the North, it is possible to hit in the other side from Gaza, in the West from the West Bank or from the sea. Experts in the region believe that Hammas acquired more advanced rockets and missiles with maritime bases. It is for a reason that the latest operations of the Israeli army concentrate on Gaza.

 

Simultaneously, the deep bureaucratic paralysis, initiated last September by Al Fath’s functionaries, aggravates the already severe economic situation in the country created after the blockage of the aid from the international community in general and very particularly from Israel. This contributed to the outburst of combats between the militias of the PNA and of the Hammas, which intensified during the last days. The last opinion polls published by the Birzeit University about the general strike show a bipolarized society -56% support against 41,5 against- at the verge of civil war. The future is in the hands of the leader’s pragmatism or fundamentalism.

 

While the international forces encamp in Lebanon, and do not disarm Hezbollah (that, they leave to the locals); and in Palestine the drums of war do no frighten anybody; the possibility that Syria will enter into a  conflict against Israel in the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967, is not excluded in a middle-long term. Last August 15th, exactly one day after the beginning of what the Syrian President, Bashar Al Assad denominates the “strategic peace”, he stated in a speech:

 

 

Al Assad recognizes that was sealed a tactic agreement that does not exclude other actions in a more or less near future. As Hammas, Syria could follow the methods of Hezbollah. In spite of the fact that recognizes Israel’s military superiority, Syria also knows that “if we cause the death of thousands with our arsenal of Scuds and biological weapons; Israel will be closer to sign another cease of fire that, with some luck, will also include the return of the mountains of the Galilee Sea”^[1].

 

Iran -the major danger for the survival of Israel- may follow Syria. In the Jewish State, they are conscious that Iran have been in Southern Lebanon during more than ten years and operates against Israel through Hezbollah and Hammas. It is believed that the might of the Shiite action is supplied by the ayatollahs regime. They know that Ahmadineyad and All Jamenel follow a strategic plan which consists of concluding their Islamic revolution and that they will start with Israel. They also warn that what currently happens in the Sinai Peninsula will move into Europe -at a middle/long term- if nothing is done in order to prevent it.

 

The truth is that Iran is the most beneficed party from the conflict. Iran increased its influence on Southern Lebanon and placed itself as a regional power. Empowered by the victory in Lebanon, the totalitarian regime might see in this situation the opportunity to impose its view on Islam and to exercise their leadership; a circumstance that would unleash the anger of Saudi Arabia, the other Muslim power. This could lead the restoration of the eternal conflict between Sunnites and Shiites. The Israelis, consequently, are conscious to the fact that the incorporation of Iran to the nuclear club would be lethal for them, and they place a bet on the approval of harsh economic sanctions. Some see as more efficient the promotion and support of the social movements that criticize the Shiite dictatorship. To promote a counterrevolution in order to overthrow the regime from inside, but with external support, a USSR style incentive. It is assessed that only some 15 or 10 percent of the Iranian population supports the regime. There is a margin for such a maneuver.

 

All these scenarios might be complemented by another, which has disastrous consequences considering the deployment of international troops (among which are 700 Spanish soldiers). Hezbollah launched a clear message: to try to disarm them is just as to defy life itself. The last September 12, Ali Ammar, a parliament member from Hezbollah, warned that “weapons are like the Evangel or the Koran”. Already on May 30, Nasrallah indicated in an interview to Al Jazzera that “any person with the serious intention to disarm the resistance -and we said this more than once- we shall cut his hands, we shall decapitate him and we shall chase his soul”.

[2]On the other side, Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two, took advantage of the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of S-11 in order to encourage the struggle of the extremists in Lebanon. If until now Iraq was the priority of the radical Islamists, ready to frustrate the American agenda in Middle East; now Lebanon might become their new attraction. The Egyptian indicated that Finul as the target of the coming attacks. “The international troops are hostile to Islam” said, and added that Lebanese should not give way to “Western pressure” and must launch a “popular war against Israelis and the West”.

 

In this opportunity, the resolution of the UN Security Council urges to act within the limit of its capacities, what influenced the tragic destiny suffered by the American and French marines in the previous operations in the region. Hezbollah has no problem to continue to be armed; yet, their main strategic challenge is within the country. The fragmented Lebanese society might revolt against the Shiite militia, blaming them for the horrors of war, and then force them to disarm. To ignore this scenario would mean to encourage the many non Shiite communities, to make justice with their own hands. The trial on the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafia Hariri, might light the spark. Beirut gives off gunpowder smell.