One of the stark delineations of power in the international community is between the official nuclear powers and the rest of the world. Although it is officially denied, many believe there is a link between nuclear status and international influence. All five states that have permanent nuclear status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are also permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council, charged with preserving the international peace. While several smaller states have given up their nuclear weapons, the world has yet to see a permanent nuclear state renounce its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, Britain’s forthcoming debate over the future of its nuclear arsenal is of great interest, not only because the United Kingdom is America’s closest ally, but because such a decision could have important international ramifications.

Des humains, des prisonniers pour la plupart, sont utilisés comme cobayes. Elles s’appelaient gerboise bleue, gerboise verte, gerboise rouge et gerboise blanche; ce ne sont là que quelques noms de code d’essais nucléaires français perpétrés dans le sud algérien. D’El Hammoudia à Reggane, à In Ekker à Tamanrasset, en passant par le massif de Tan Afella dans le Hoggar, l’horreur est la même.

L’Algérie et les Etats-Unis sont sur le point de signer un accord de coopération dans le domaine du nucléaire civil, a annoncé l’ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Alger, Robert S. Ford, dans un entretien au confrère La Tribune. «Nous avons discuté avec les Algériens de recherche et de collaboration dans ce domaine. Nous sommes sur le point de signer un accord de coopération entre nos deux pays dans le domaine de la collaboration dans l’énergie atomique», a déclaré l’ambassadeur américain.

This article argues that the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation has significant merit, promising tangible energy, economic, and security benefits to India, the United States and the wider international community. India’s acute energy needs and the upsides of the deal are greater than is generally appreciated. And while possible proliferation downsides exist, they have been exaggerated. The article lays out the argument in four parts. First, it examines India’s energy situation and its relationship to the Indian economy. Second, it looks at India’s options for improving its energy outlook and the role of nuclear energy among those options. Next, it addresses proliferation concerns; and, finally, it ends with a discussion of regional security considerations, especially with respect to a possible arms race with China.

On 6 June 2006, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of a taskforce to undertake an objective, scientific and comprehensive review into uranium mining, value-added processing and the contribution of nuclear energy in Australia in the longer term. This is known as the Review of Uranium Mining Processing and Nuclear Energy in Australia, referred to in this report as the Review.

In early September, as Kofi Annan passed through the Middle East on a farewell journey as United Nations secretary general, he made a stop in Tehran. There, in a meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, Iran’s president, he heard something startling.

President Jacques Chirac said this week that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a big danger, and that if Iran were to launch a nuclear weapon against a country like Israel, it would lead to the immediate destruction of Tehran.

Ouvrant, hier à l’hôtel El-Aurassi, les travaux de la Conférence régionale africaine sur la contribution de l’énergie nucléaire à la paix et au développement durable, le président de la République, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, s’est fait l’apôtre du droit légitime de l’Afrique à l’utilisation «juste et démocratique » à des fins exclusivement pacifiques de cette énergie.

Le Conseil de sécurité dispose-t-il de toutes les prérogatives et de tous les moyens juridiques pour empêcher la prolifération d’armes nucléaires. En théorie, oui, mais dans la pratique, le Conseil de sécurité est sélectif dans la mise en œuvre du TNP. Ainsi, seuls l’Iran et la Corée du Nord sont dans le collimateur de l’instance onusienne et des puissances nucléaires occidentales. Israël, qui s’est toujours fait passer pour la victime de l’histoire, a développé, avec le soutien de l’Occident, l’arme nucléaire et menace toute une région sans être inquiété. Pis, Israël refuse catégoriquement que l’AIE inspecte ses installations nucléaires. Mais Israël est le protégé de Washington, le gendarme du monde qui fait la loi du monde en fonction de ses intérêts géopolitiques.

Une conférence régionale africaine sur la contribution de l’énergie nucléaire à la paix et au développement durable. Pourquoi faire ? L’opportunité de sa tenue dans la capitale algérienne. Nucléaire, paix. Deux notions antinomiques?

At a time when most world powers have forged a united front against Iran because of its nuclear program, President Jacques Chirac arranged to send his foreign minister to Tehran to talk about a side issue, then abruptly canceled the visit earlier this month in embarrassing failure.

Une conférence africaine sur le nucléaire se tient, depuis hier à Alger, avec pour objectif de rationaliser l’utilisation du nucléaire et le mettre au service du développement de la communauté africaine. L’intitulé même de la conférence axée sur l’apport de l’énergie nucléaire «à la paix et au développement durable» en Afrique est tout un programme.

Le président de la République a souligné hier, l’urgence d’accélérer le processus de ratification devant hâter l’entrée en vigueur du Traité d’interdiction des essais nucléaires. Dans un discours, prononcé à l’occasion de l’ouverture de la conférence régionale africaine sur l’énergie nucléaire qui se tient à l’hôtel El Aurassi, et dont les travaux se poursuivent jusqu’à aujourd’hui, Abdelaziz Bouteflika a alerté l’opinion internationale quant «au risque que des armes nucléaires ou des sources radioactives tombent entre les mains de groupes terroristes ou autres acteurs non-étatiques».

U.S. official statements leave little doubt that cooperation occurred, but there are significant details missing on the scope of cooperation and the role of Pakistan’s government. North Korea and Pakistan both initially denied that nuclear technology was provided to North Korea; President Musharraf admitted, however, in 2006 that such technology had been transferred. This report describes the nature and evidence of the cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan in missiles and nuclear weapons, the impact of cooperation on their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and on the international nonproliferation regime. It will be updated as events warrant.

Le premier réacteur nucléaire de recherche marocain est fin prêt. De type Triga Mark II, il subit actuellement des essais à froid. La partie nucléaire sera déclenchée courant décembre. Tous les préalables techniques et réglementaires ont été remplis. L’annonce officielle de son lancement est attendue dans les jours qui viennent. Celle-ci est tributaire d’une décision politique, ce qui explique également le retard pris dans la mise en place de ce réacteur.

In the late 1990s, U.S. intelligence indicated that North Korea was trying to procure materials for the construction of a uranium enrichment facility that could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In October 2002, James A. Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, traveled to Pyongyang and confronted North Korean officials on their suspected uranium enrichment program. The Agreed Framework subsequently unraveled and North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. The Bush administration ultimately decided that bilateral talks with Pyongyang were not the answer and chose to pursue a multilateral forum to address the DPRK nuclear problem. That policy has been carried out under the prevue of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, Japan, North and South Korea, Russia and the United States.

As the United States and some of its allies prepare to send warships to help enforce UNSC Resolution 1718 against North Korea, it would do well to take a hard look at the politics of the situation, particularly regarding at (or over) sea interdictions. Frankly China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are unlikely to be directly involved in such interdictions, albeit for different reasons. And all but Japan would not welcome such interdictions by outsiders especially in waters under their jurisdiction. Indeed it is not clear who can or will do what to enforce the Resolution at or over the sea.

North Korea’s nuclear program got off to an early start with Soviet assistance in the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, the Kim regime was embarking on a nuclear weapons program with the construction of a large reprocessing plant to make weapons-grade plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Meanwhile, Kim Il Sung assured the international community that his country had no intention of building a nuclear weapon, which he said would be useless in the face of a massive American nuclear arsenal. In the early 1990s, fearing that North Korea might already have reprocessed sufficient plutonium for two small nuclear devices, the United States began negotiating what was called the “Agreed Framework,” which would give.

Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, the Iranian regime has a clear and intense interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers are located to its North, East, and West, and the U.S. military is positioned on all its land and sea borders. The lesson of the Iraqi and North Korean experience is that countries that pursue antagonistic policies toward the U.S. are much less likely to face military intervention if they possess nuclear weapons.

As the impasse over Iran’s nuclear-weapons program grows inexorably into a crisis, a kind of consensus has taken root in the minds of America’s foreign-policy elite. This is that military action against Iran is a sure formula for disaster. The essence of the position was expressed in a cover story in Time magazine this past September.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. As the United Nations Security Council met and approved a resolution condemning the tests and calling for punitive sanctions, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, makes it very plain why the U.N. has become the Trojan horse of nuclear proliferation. In an interview with Newsweek magazine on Oct. 20, Mr. ElBaradei laid bare his plan -- guaranteed to lead the international community into nuclear war.

For nearly 50 years, worries about a nuclear Middle East centered on Israel. Arab leaders resented the fact that Israel was the only atomic power in the region, a resentment heightened by America’s tacit approval of the situation. But they were also pretty certain that Israel (which has never explicitly acknowledged having nuclear weapons) would not drop the bomb except as a very last resort. That is why Egypt and Syria were unafraid to attack Israel during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. “Israel will not be the first country in the region to use nuclear weapons,” went the Israelis’ coy formula. “Nor will it be the second.”

Now that North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, perhaps the time has come to openly accept the demise of the global nuclear arms control and non-proliferation regime. From Iran and North Korea to the nuclear black market of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, new challenges continue to emerge and threaten to undermine the global arms control architecture.

In a speech at the National Democratic Party's conference on September 19, 2006, General Secretary of the Policy Committee Gamal Mubarak said that Egypt is ready to continue its nuclear research program, which was ended (at least officially) after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. A few days later, his father, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, confirmed his son's statement. He said that Egypt must take advantage of new energy sources and that the development of a peaceful nuclear program is part of such an intention.

A comprehensive test ban treaty, or CTBT, is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties currently limit testing to underground only, with a maximum force equal to 150,000 tons of TNT. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not conducted nuclear tests since 1990. North Korea announced in October 2006 that it will conduct a nuclear test in the future.

First, working closely with China obviously is a very important aspect of our strategy toward North Korea, but we need to be realistic about our differences. We all should appreciate the role that China has played as host of the Six-Party Talks. I have no doubt that Chi¬na’s leaders are sincerely interested in a diplomatic resolution of the core issues on the Korean peninsula. They have done a agnificent job bringing the differ¬ent parties together and facilitating dialogue on a critical issue. All of us involved should thank them.

Too often obscured by the smoke of transatlantic tensions over the best “means” to reach foreign policy goals is the fact that the United States and the states of Europe still tend to agree fundamentally on what are the desired “ends.” Shared transatlantic global interests today span questions such as countering international terrorism, promoting democratic government, economic development, and regional security and stability, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But disagreement between the United States and its European partners over exactly how to pursue such broad objectives can sometimes call into question each side’s perception of whether the other really is committed to achieving the same end result.

Le débat s’engage : nucléaire civil, militaire ? Réaménagements des équilibres de force ? Légalités des pressions des puissances mondiales ? L’après-pétrole suffit-il à justifier cette course ? La scène mondiale est en émoi suite au dossier iranien et aux menaces nord-coréennes de procéder à des essais.

Smugglers have been caught trying to traffick dangerous radioactive material more than 300 times since 2002, statistics from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) show. Most of the incidents are understood to have occurred in Europe. The disclosures come as al-Qaeda is known to be intensfiying its efforts to obtain a radoactive device. Last year, Western security services, including MI5 and MI6, thwarted 16 attempts to smuggle plutonium or uranium. On two occasions small quantities of highly enriched uranium were reported missing. All were feared to have been destined for terror groups.

The United States is confident that Russia and China will join it in pushing for U.N. sanctions against Iran if it does not agree to suspend enriching uranium this week, a senior U.S. official said yesterday.

The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement: on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement working alone at home.

A forgotten letter in which the founder of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, cited a need for nuclear weapons has stoked a debate over whether to negotiate with the West and raised questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions today.

Beijing’s cautious approach to defusing recent international tension over North Korea’s ballistic missile launches underscores the dilemmas it addresses in its difficult relationship with Pyongyang on the one hand and its interests with respect to the United States on the other. The missile launches were conducted in the midst of China’s renewed diplomacy to revive the stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs. Beijing is now likely to redouble efforts to revive the talks as the most effective mechanism to resolve the issues of both Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

There are no bells, no sirens, and no early-warning systems that signal Iran’s eastward shift. After struggling to develop political and commercial relations with the United States and Europe, Iran has forsaken this approach. Having survived 25 years of isolation, war, and sanctions, Iran’s leadership is no longer willing to bargain away its national security concerns, nuclear ambitions, human rights policy, or commercial creativity for unfavorable Western political and trade incentives. The Iranian regime is looking to the East, where human rights violations and proliferation proclivities are considered practical matters of regime survival.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a kind of security regime which was established at President Bush’s suggestion in May 2003. Its purpose is to intercept vehicles, ships, and airplanes in order to protect against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Seventeen countries including the United States have currently joined in the PSI, and over sixty countries in the world support this initiative. PSI activities have been mainly focused on the interception of ships, which has had a practical effect since 2003. The reason is that the proliferation of WMD is generally accomplished by transportation using ships.

If the United States fails to achieve a diplomatic outcome that provides the international community with sufficient confidence that Iran is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, the results are likely to be dire. In the already volatile Middle East, the logical consequences of diplomatic failure are either an extended military conflict or a nuclear arms race, or both.

The North Korea proliferation problem is one of the two most dangerous flashpoints in East Asia today. It involves many complex issues: the legacy of Cold War divisions; nationalism in Northeast Asia; Sino-American rivalry for leadership and allies; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (both within the region and beyond); and finally, humanitarian tragedy. This article will evaluate one important issue among these interrelated issues is the role of the Sino-American relationship to the North Korea issue. It will do so by carefully evaluating Chinese policy toward North Korea and then considering the implications for the United States. It will argue that Chinese policy toward the North Korea proliferation issue is best understood as one manifestation of its overall policy toward East Asia. Beyond that, from a U.S. perspective, this policy has been much more positive than is commonly assumed.

Iran has had a nuclear program for close to 50 years, beginning with a research reactor purchased from the United States in 1959. The Shah’s plan to build 23 nuclear power reactors by the 1990s was regarded as grandiose, but not necessarily viewed as a “back door” to a nuclear weapons program, possibly because Iran did not then seek the technologies to enrich or reprocess its own fuel.There were a few suspicions of a nuclear weapons program, but these abated in the decade between the Iranian 1979 revolution and the end of the Iran-Iraq war, both of which brought a halt to nuclear activities.

Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range missile, biological, and nuclear technologies.

During the Cold War, both sides possessed weapons of mass destruction, but neither side used them, deterred by what was known as MAD, mutual assured destruction. Similar constraints have no doubt prevented their use in the confrontation between India and Pakistan. In our own day a new such confrontation seems to be looming between a nuclear-armed Iran and its favorite enemies, named by the late Ayatollah Khomeini as the Great Satan and the Little Satan, i.e., the United States and Israel. Against the U.S. the bombs might be delivered by terrorists, a method having the advantage of bearing no return address. Against Israel, the target is small enough to attempt obliteration by direct bombardment.

You don't hear much any more about "road maps," the "peace process," or "land for peace." The struggle for the Middle East has apparently entered a new phase in which Iran hijacks the Palestinian cause in order to establish its own influence in the region.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to provide my assessment of the recent North Korean missile launches and their implications for US policy options with respect to North Korea. I would like to note for the record that I am appearing in a personal capacity, and that the views I am expressing are my own.

For the first time in over a decade, the Russian government has published a White Paper on Nonproliferation, which seeks to present a detailed overview of Russia's policy and initiatives in that area. The document was prepared under the auspices of the Military-Industrial Commission and unveiled by the Chairman of the MIC, Vice-Premier and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov on June 30, 2006. The White Paper provides a more comprehensive analysis of nonproliferation challenges and policies than earlier Russian conceptual documents on security and defense policy, including the 2005 "Principles of the Policy of the Russian Federation State in the Sphere of the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery."

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you, along with Ranking Member Delahunt and the other distinguished members of the subcommittee, for giving me the opportu-nity to appear before you on the topic of U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy: Policies and Technical Capabilities.

Washington -- Accuse the U.S. State Department's Nicholas Burns of a double standard in advancing the Bush administration's efforts to stop nuclear-weapons proliferation, and he will thank you for the compliment.

North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.

The argument for overcoming the nuclear impasse with India – for altering the nuclear status quo that cut India off from international civil nuclear cooperation for over 30 years – has become increasingly persuasive. It has been clear for many years that maintaining existing U.S. laws and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines prohibiting such cooperation would not succeed in inducing New Delhi to join the NPT or give up nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute foreign policy problem for the United States.

Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying destructive potential. Their energy release is a million times larger than that of previous explosives. Mass destruction is inevitable if they are used in conflicts. One primitive atomic bomb destroyed — literally wiped out — the Japanese city of Hiroshima at the end of World War ii, causing more than 200,000 casualties. That bomb was little more than a trigger of a modern thermonuclear — or so-called hydrogen — bomb that releases 100 times or more destructive energy. There are several tens of thousands of them in the world today.

The presence of this provision quite properly raises questions about whether the central purpose of the NPT, which is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear powers acknowledged by the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States), is undermined.

The key point I want to make today is that the Iranian government is wrong when it claims that the NPT guarantees it a right to make nuclear fuel. Just because a nuclear activity or material can be used for peaceful purposes does not mean that any member of the NPT has an unconditional right to pursue or acquire it especially when the activity or material in question might bring it within days of having a bomb.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the creation of a “global partnership,” which would include “full” civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Such cooperation would reverse almost 30 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The United States has been a leader of worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, the international community and many individual states have agreed to a range of treaties, laws, and agreements known collectively as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, aimed at keeping nations that do not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them.

Como parte de su evaluación de la veracidad y totalidad de las declaraciones de Irán concernientes a su programa de enriquecimiento, la Agencia continúa investigando la fuente(s) de las partículas de uranio de bajo enriquecimiento (LEU), y de algunas de uranio de alto enriquecimiento (HEU), que fueron descubiertas en localizaciones en donde Irán ha declarado que los componentes de centrifugadora habían sido fabricados, utilizados y / o almacenados.

The problem of Chinese nuclear proliferation persists. The focus of attention has shifted from transfers directed by officials as an instrument of government policy to sales by Chinese firms that occur because of gaps in the Chinese domestic enforcement network.

Nonproliferation advocates in Washington argue that recent U.S. efforts extending civilian nuclear cooperation with India would undercut global nonproliferation. One argument is that many states like Japan and Brazil either had nuclear bombs or the ability to make them but gave up that ability in return for the civilian nuclear cooperation guaranteed by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Iranian engineers have completed sophisticated drawings of a deep subterranean shaft, according to officials who have examined classified documents in the hands of U.S. intelligence for more than 20 months.

The report indicated that the Complex had redundant facilities, security concerns, high cost, excessive competition between the weapons labs, and inadequate equipment for the production plants. To redress these problems, the Task Force proposed restructuring the Complex.

It is important to reject the view that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is inevitable, that there’s nothing that can be done to stop it. If the U.S. and other key actors do not change some of their policies, Iran probably will proceed to acquire the bomb.

It deems necessary for Iran to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;

La idea no es transferir el caso al Consejo de Seguridad, sino de hacer un informe al Consejo de Seguridad para que, posteriormente, éste pueda reforzar la autoridad de la AIEA. El caso no dejará la AIEA para ir al Consejo de Seguridad. Es un proceso interactivo, progresivo y también reversible si Irán cumple con las acciones que se esperan de él.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has uncovered potential connections between Iran’s nuclear energy program and military efforts on missiles and explosives, the New York Times reported today.

The IAEA Secretariat received today a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran in which Iran informed the Agency that it "has decided to resume from 9 January 2006 those R & D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension."

There are three main features to this changing scene: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technology; the emergence of clandestine procurement networks in nuclear materials and equipment; and the sluggishness in nuclear disarmament. In response to this changing landscape, I would like to suggest a few practical steps that can help us address these emerging challenges.

La Agencia continúa analizando la fuente(s) de las partículas de uranio de baja riqueza (LEU), y algunas partículas de uranio altamente enriquecido (HEU), que fueron descubiertas en Irán con vistas a garantizar la veracidad y fidelidad de las declaraciones de Irán referentes a sus actividades de enriquecimiento.

IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country’s nuclear activities rather than only verifying the peaceful use of a country’s declared nuclear material.

The lead-up to the war in Iraq put the issue of the potential acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups at the top of the list of Western priorities.

The United States has had some success in helping bring noncompliant countries back into compliance with their agreements and commitments, and in demonstrating that their return to compliance leads to improved relations.

Nonproliferation is the pre-eminent national security issue of our time, and there is probably no more important U.S. foreign policy goal than keeping nuclear weapons and the ingredients and know-how to make them out of the hands of those who would do us harm.

Thirty-five years ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up.

As painful experience in Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran has shown, the rules that govern nuclear exports, safeguard nuclear materials, and control and eliminate nuclear weapons are not self-enforcing.