With the September 2005 parliamentary elections; Afghanistan took another important step toward democracy and stability. Over the past foru years; President Hamid Karzai's government has put an end to decades of civil war and offered the Afghan people the possibility of rising from their abject poverty.

In June 2005, a U.S. infantry battalion hunting for Taliban insurgents in the Zabol province of southern Afghanistan came upon the remote village of Badamtoy, where they were warmly greeted. After providing gifts of medicine and toys, the commanding officer asked to speak with the village elder. The elder, when asked about the Taliban, replied that they had not been seen for months.

In the past six months, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan and further threatened the international effort there. The handover of command from the US-led coalition to NATO means that Afghanistan is now not only the first battleground of the so-called “War on Terror,” but a testing ground for the future of the Atlantic alliance. The Taliban-led insurgency based in Pakistan has shown new capabilities in the south and east, challenging both the US and NATO, while suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their successful use by the Iraqi insurgents, have sown terror in Kabul and other areas as well.2 A particularly daring attack on a Coalition convoy killed 16 people, including two US soldiers, close to the US embassy in one of the most heavily defended areas of Kabul on September 8.

Since the formation of Afghanistan, its nature as a Pashtun state has affected all its international relations. On the other hand, the fact that it was originally established as a buffer state between Britain and Russia still governs its national integration. In this article I examine Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors through an investigation of its history and the present conditions of its borders with its southern, western and northern neighbors. My aim is to obtain an overall perspective of Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors, historically decisive elements, and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The international community is just months away from decisions that are expected to make Kosovo a state, but planning for the security ramifications has not kept pace. It must avoid creating a weak state; the future Kosovo needs adequate institutions to ensure the rule of law and the inviolability of its borders, and to combat transnational organised crime and terrorism. Elements important for building a sustainable state must not be traded away to achieve recognition of Kosovo’s independence. A key component of post-independence security structures should be an army built in part upon the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), albeit a small one oriented to international missions like peacekeeping and subject in the first years to strict NATO control and limitations on its size and capabilities.

NATO on Monday took over command of international forces from the United States in southern Afghanistan, where the fight against the Taliban insurgency has turned more deadly than at any time since American forces ousted the radical Islamist movement in 2001.

In the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan looked to the international community--and to the United States, in particular--to rebuild an indigenous national police force. More than four years later, however, the Afghan National Police (ANP) remain ill-equipped and ill-disciplined, a glaring blind spot against a revived insurgency. The story of the ANP reveals not only the crucial importance of police assistance in the global War on Terror, but the ways in which the U.S. government, as currently organized, is fundamentally incapable of carrying out this kind of mission effectively.

A large springtime offensive by Taliban fighters has turned into the strongest show of force by the insurgents since U.S. forces drove the Taliban from power in late 2001. Afghan and foreign officials and local villagers blame a lack of U.S.-led coalition forces on the ground for the resurgence.

I want to preface my remarks by saying that Kati and I believe firmly that this commitment is absolutely essential in Afghanistan. We’re in Afghanistan because it is where the 9/11 attacks were planned. And if we lose in Afghanistan – and I’ll get back to what we mean by lose in a minute – if we lose in Afghanistan the Taliban and their close allies, Al Qaeda, will return.

The fledgling National Assembly can play a vital role in stabilising Afghanistan and holding President Karzai’s administration accountable but only if it gives voice to the country’s diverse population and gets major help from international actors. Its oft-delayed inauguration in December 2005 completed formation of the country’s main governing bodies but marked more the beginning of a political transition than its end.

President Bush and President Musharraf have affirmed the long-term, strategic partnership between their two countries. In 2004, the United States acknowledged its aspirations for closer bilateral ties with Pakistan by designating Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. The U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership is based on the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan in building stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting peace and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe.

In 2006, NATO will expand its operation in Afghanistan to the southern sector and the eastern sector of the country, which means that by that the end of the year -certainly by the time the Prague [Riga] summit rolls around -that Afghanistan could be a NATO mission. As a matter of fact, I think Afghanistan will be a NATO mission by that time.

The catalogue of what we have lost for refusing to increase the size of the force to respond to the post-9/11 world is considerable. It has played out in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the larger war on terror, and is causing structural damage to the force itself.