This brief is the outcome of Marcin Zaborowski’s mission to Washington DC between 20-26 March 2006. During his trip Marcin attended a conference on ‘NATO and the EU: Improving Practical Cooperation’ at the National Defence University, visited the Office of European Union and Regional Affairs, the Office of Arabian Peninsula & Iran Affairs and the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department. Marcin also met some staff members from the two Houses of Congress and the Library of Congress as well as from some leading think-tanks.

This note assesses the impact of the political crisis affecting the EU in the wake of the constitutional referenda, specifically with reference to the image and performance of the Union in the wider international world. The basic assumption is that the viability of CFSP and of EC external relations largely depends on the political cohesion of the EU. This is even more the case for a unique, rule-based and supposedly value-driven international actor like the EU. First, the note addresses some of the defining characteristics of the European project, highlights its distinctiveness and explores its shortcomings in a turbulent international environment. Second, the note touches upon the root causes of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch national referenda, in order to explore the political implications of the crisis for the EU's external posture. The note concludes that renewed internal political cohesion is a necessary pre-condition for the Union to stand up to its reputation of global norm-setter and to perform effectively as a strategic international actor in foreign and security policy.

Although the EU faces a wide array of challenges from beyond its borders, it is ill-equipped to deal with them. The Union seldom takes a strategic approach to foreign policy. Its institutions and member-states often fail to co-ordinate their various policies and instruments – including trade, aid, defence, policing and diplomacy – in the pursuit of common objectives. The institutions of the ‘rotating presidency’ and the ‘troika’ (the representation of the EU by the presidency’s foreign minister, the High Representative and the commissioner for external relations) limit the EU’s effectiveness. The loss of the constitutional treaty has deprived the EU of some sensible reforms to the way it makes and manages foreign policy. However, even with the current treaties, the EU could do plenty to strengthen its foreign policy. This policy brief suggests ways of encouraging the EU to take a more strategic approach to foreign policy; of diminishing the role of the rotating presidency; of ensuring that the memberstates and EU institutions feel a sense of shared ownership of external policies; and of achieving more coherence between the policies of the member-states and the institutions.

In December 2005, the EU-25 adopted the new Strategy for Africa, based on the Millennium Development Goals. Keeping the commitments requires the new member states and re-emerging donors to adapt their development tools and policies. They are rediscovering the African continent, which has not been part of their foreign policy priorities since 1989. Indeed, the older member states have long experiences in development assistance to Africa: how can they transfer their expertise to the new member states within the European framework? Having learnt from their recent democratic and economic transitions, to what extent can the new member states contribute to Africa’s development?