A large number of various types of terrorist organisations have an active presence in the EU. Some of them aim at Member States or Third State targets situated in Member States, whereas some others who conduct their campaigns mainly outside the EU, use the EU as their logistical base or for fundraising.

The phrase “A Nation at War” evokes images of mobilization of the nation’s resources: military surely, but also the government, industry, and the population. Thus far in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), though, the mobilization has not been on the scale seen in past “global” wars. As the Nation approached the 5-year mark of the start of the GWOT, the USAWC focused the attention of its Seventeenth Annual Strategy Conference on whether or not the evidence supports the continuing assumption that the Nation is really at war. Some would insist that the answer is obviously yes. The conference studied this question in depth with panels on the homeland security aspects, the international context, the legal foundation for the war, and the associated economic and domestic policy issues. The conclusion was that the answer to the question is not as clear as first thought. Much of the evidence suggests that the Nation—or at least some parts of it—is not at war.

Alors que le Pakistan est au cœur d’une polémique des services de renseignement américains sur leur laxisme à l’égard du développement des camps d’entraînement dans la province incontrôlée du Waziristân, Islamabad cherche à rassurer ses partenaires dans la lutte antiterroriste dont l’Algérie.

While Algeria appears to have succeeded in defeating the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, in reality the threat can still not be discounted. Emily Hunt explains why the militants'silence does not necessarily mean they are defeated, but may instead show that the group is evolving into a structure that will be much harder to defeat.

When the predominantly Sunni Muslim country of Bangladesh was established as a secessionist state from Pakistan in 1971, its constitution declared that it would be both democratic and secular. Periods of democratic rule, however, were interrupted by coups, martial law, and states of emergency. In 1988, the Bangladeshi parliament approved a constitutional amendment making Islam the state religion of Bangladesh.

The CT Calendar is designed for anyone concerned with terrorism or threat: lawenforcement, intelligence, military, security personnel, contingency planners, or simply citizens concerned by terrorist threats. The Calendar is oriented primarily to readers in the United States, but we hope that we have also made it useful for citizens of other countries. We welcome suggestions on ways to improve the Counterterrorism Calendar.

A casual reading of major newspapers would leave one with the impression that terrorists are running rampant across Africa. Terrorists are said to hide out in the multiple lawless and stateless areas that litter the continent; they supposedly gain recruits from among the starving and displaced masses who have been victimized by powerful warlords and governments that are fighting over the continent’s spoils. Militant Islamic recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable communities, building militant organizations and recruiting the next generation of suicide bombers from the ranks of the poor Africans.

This report provides a review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and the status of their implementation at the end of the 109th Congress. The discussions herein are organized on the basis of policy themes that are at the core of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, rather than through a review of each numbered item set out in the Commission’s final report. The analysis was produced by a large team of CRS Specialists, analysts, and attorneys who are responsible for the wide variety of policy areas covered by the 9/11 Commission in its work. The authors of the varied segments of this report are identified in footnotes. Each section of the report summarizes the pertinent elements of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation relevant to the section’s policy theme.

The American people need to prepare for a long-duration war against radical Muslims who are set to fight for 50 to 100 years to create an Islamist state in the region, a top Pentagon strategist in the war on terror says.

The “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety of the terrorist or extremist threat facing the United States. Clearly, Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders hope that their efforts will persuade other Islamic militant groups to join the global jihad. But what about the terrorist or extremist groups that are not part of the al-Qaeda network and do not adhere to its agenda? The temptation for policymakers is to set aside groups that have not chosen to join al-Qaeda as less dangerous. Yet these Islamist groups, non-Islamist terrorists, and criminal organizations still pose a threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies. This volume, therefore, addresses the threats outside the al-Qaeda universe.

The objective of this RAND Corporation study, undertaken as part of a project entitled “Beyond al-Qaeda: Countering Future Terrorist and Other Nontraditional Threats to U.S. Security,” is to understand the shape of future threats to the United States and U.S. security interests from terrorist and other extremist organizations. We do this through analyses that draw together the various threat strands that are informing current U.S. thinking in the war on terror. The study looks specifically at four sources of threats.

Since the invasion of Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,the “field commander” of al-Qaeda in Iraq, has arguably become the face of Islamist terrorism and what is often referred to as the “salafi-jihadi” movement. Bloody beheadings, grisly bombings and Zarqawi’s skillful use of the media including the Internet have brought him increasing notoriety. But despite this notoriety, little is known about how this once petty thug and small-time criminal became al-Qaeda’s “emir” in Mesopotamia and one of the leading lights of the global salafi-jihadi movement.

This will be a long struggle. Osama bin Laden says al Qaeda will be patient and steadfast and fight until "the one whose time has come dies first". We too must be steadfast and patient. We must also be clear-eyed about the ideology that inspires and motivates al Qaeda and its imitators. The challenge is not just to keep Australians safe from terrorist attack, it is also to understand the appeal of and defeat an ideology that is more political than it is religious. It is an ideology which challenges the values and ideals that are universal - freedom of speech, religious freedom and freedom from fear and intimidation.

I want to talk today about the threat we face from terrorist groups like al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. I’m conscious that many people wonder where this violent extremism has come from and what could possibly drive a person to become a suicide bomber. Australians naturally ask: why are we a terrorist target and how we can eventually defeat the terrorists?

The Salafist Group for Call (or Preaching) and Combat (GSPC), was born out of Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA) which threatened Algeria and its inhabitants after the country outlawed and imprisoned members of Algeria’s largest Islamic party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), following the legislative elections in 1992. GSPC, a splinter group of GIA, formed to offer an alternative to the murderous tactics of its parent organization. For years following the voided election in 1992, GIA “engaged in frequent attacks against civilians (especially journalists, intellectuals and secular schools) and government workers, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation.

Since the attack on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, both those who sanctioned and organized the atrocity, and those who initiated the War on Terror have succeeded in fomenting a long-drawn-out battle that has opened up many fronts.

This essay contends that allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them and their institutional form is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Despite these differences, some of the alliance dilemmas that plagued the United States in the past are likely to remain, though they will have different manifestations relevant to the war on terrorism. This essay concludes by arguing that, for purposes of the war on terrorism, the list of key allies has shifted and offers recommendations for improving US alliances.

This paper will describe the authors’ efforts to model the financial operations and organizational behavior of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by its French initials, GSPC), using Stella® version 9.0, a commercially-available system dynamics software package. The model aggregates empirical knowledge and collective expert opinion on the GSPC financial subsystem into a single cognitive tool. Using the model for exploratory analysis suggests answers to questions such as how funding affects the quantity and type of GSPC operations, how the financial and operational aspects of the organization change over its life cycle, and what policymakers should expect next from the GSPC. Finally, the model allows users to see the full range of effects from different policy choices, including effects policymakers may not intend.

I have been Director General of the Security Service (MI5) since 2002. Before that I was Deputy Director General for five years. During that time, and before, I have witnessed a steady increase in the terrorist threat to the UK. It has been the subject of much comment and controversy. I rarely speak in public. I prefer to avoid the limelight and get on with my job. But today, I want to set out my views on the realities of the terrorist threat facing the UK in 2006; what motivates those who pose that threat; and what my Service is doing, with others, to counter it.

This Bulletin deals with Hezbollah’s place in Iranian strategy and the vast amounts of aid and support Iran has given the organization since its founding 24 years ago. Hezbollah, and the Lebanese Shi’ite community among whom it took root, are actually the only successful example of exporting the Islamic revolution. Hezbollah also demonstrates how Iran uses the concept to further its ambitions for regional hegemony and the struggle against Israel and the West.

The advent of two nuclear powers in the region, discoveries of nuclear trafficking, and insurgencies and terrorism that threaten important U.S. interests and objectives directly have transformed South Asia into a primary theater of concern for the United States. The United States, to a great extent free of the restrictions of earlier sanction regimes and attentive to the region’s central role in the global war on terrorism, has engaged the states of South Asia aggressively with a wide variety of policy initiatives. Despite the diversity of policy instruments, few are very powerful; indeed, only the U.S. military seems to offer many options for Washington to intensify further its security cooperation and influence in the region.

The events of the past 5 years have underlined that the United States and its Allies in the First World confront a very different strategic environment from the relatively peaceful and calm environment that so many predicted in the aftermath of the Cold War.1 It appears now more likely that Samuel Huntington’s darker view of where the world was going that he postulated in his article in Foreign Affairs—“The Clash of Civilizations”—captured the possibilities that already were emerging in the early 1990s.2 This author would and has argued that the future and its implications are even darker than what Professor Huntington suggested. The confluence between the world’s greatest reserves of petroleum and the extraordinary difficulties that the Islamic World is having, and will continue to have, in confronting a civilization that it has taken the West 900 years to develop will create challenges that strategists are only now beginning to grasp.

Protection of nuclear power plants from land-based assaults, deliberate aircraft crashes, and other terrorist acts has been a heightened national priority since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has strengthened its regulations on nuclear reactor security, but critics contend that implementation by the industry has been too slow and that further measures are needed. Several provisions to increase nuclear reactor security are included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, signed August 8, 2005. The law requires NRC to conduct “force-on-force” security exercises at nuclear power plants at least once every three years and to revise the “design-basis threat” that nuclear plant security forces must be able to meet, among other measures. This report will be updated as events warrant.

I made the first of the speeches which inspired this pamphlet back in March this year. Since then events have moved on. In Iraq, terrorists undermine prospects for peace and prosperity. In Afghanistan, NATO troops engage in fighting of renewed intensity as the Taliban try to resist the democratic government. In the Middle East, a tragedy unfolded this summer, and now the region is trying to rebuild. I do not pretend that no mistakes have been made, or that major problems do not confront us. But none of these events have changed my basic thesis. Instead they have brought it into sharper relief.

This Strategic Study on Bioterrorism was conducted to increase the awareness of the threat of bioterror and to identify means by which States can prevent and respond to such threats to increase their biosecurity. It addressed bio-threat and response scenarios, risk assessment, modern diagnostic techniques and methods to strengthen apabilities for early detection, surveillance and response to natural and bioterror disease outbreaks, the technical issues to be solved and political, social and psychological aspects of bioterrorism. The Group recommended that in order to prevent dangerous microorganisms from falling into the hands of terrorists, it is essential to secure and onsolidate them in certified facilities or destroy them.

Violent Jihad in the Netherlands charts the phenomenon of Dutch-based jihadist networks which represent the terrorist threat currently confronting us. The paper provides insight into the emergence of these networks and their development over the past few years. The most important trend observed by the AIVD is the fact that the jihadist threat is increasingly rooted in our own society. The principal causes are the processes of radicalisation and recruitment among young Muslims. In addition to peer pressure, the internet plays an increasingly important role.

Le Pentagone s’intéresse à l’Islam. Des analystes et chercheurs, travaillant pour le compte du ministère de la Défense des USA, ont conclu, dans le rapport qu’ils ont établi, que les activistes islamistes s’inspirent des versets coraniques pour accomplir des attentats-suicide. Les auteurs du rapport classé secret d’Etat, divulgué par un site d’information américain, World Net Daily, se sont appuyés sur certains versets du Coran qui encouragent et incitent les musulmans à combattre les non croyants en leur promettant d’aller au paradis.

Great Britain’s successful prevention of a recent terrorist plot to destroy multiple American airliners flying from London to the United States in mid-air has prompted questions whether our counter-terrorism efforts can be improved. Some have suggested that British authorities enjoy broader law enforcement powers to investigate and detain terrorists, and asked whether we can learn from and adopt British practices. This idea has a basic attractiveness because the United States and Great Britain share a common cultural heritage, face a similar threat from international terrorism, and operate a common law legal system.

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

Although they worked together nominally, the central Al Qaeda network, as led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s terrorist group in Iraq held vastly different conceptions of jihad. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq minimized the magnitude of that ideological clash, enabling Zarqawi’s limited cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Iraqi arena. Although they used each other for tactical support, publicity, and recruiting purposes, their doctrinal differences made them only allies of convenience rather than genuine partners, and as Zarqawi’s tactics grew more extreme and indiscriminate, Al Qaeda chose to distance itself from his handiwork.

As part of the global war on terror, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom showcased the dazzling technological capability and professional prowess of the U.S. military in conventional operations.Yet the subsequent challenges posed by insurgency and instability in both Afghanistan and Iraq have proved much more difficult to surmount for both the military and civilian agencies.

Dear Prime Minister, I write to you on the fifth anniversary of 9/11. Because you are a leading world statesman, and I think your decision to reveal the date of your retirement from office in your own time was the right one, may I presume to suggest that now is the time to make a big speech addressed personally to Osama bin Laden. No world statesman has attempted to challenge this aberration of humankind into debate.

In January 2002, I wrote that following the battle in Afghanistan (and before the war in Iraq) the next target in the war on terror should be Lebanon. The case for destroying Hezbollah four years ago is the same as it is today, namely, that it creates instability in the region and threatens our interests. If the group had been eliminated at that time, the current conflict would never have happened.

Over the last few years, women suicide bombers have earned the dubious distinction of appearing more newsworthy than their male counterparts. While investigative reporting on a male suicide bomber is often extensive, coverage of a female suicide bomber seems to result in more widespread media exposure. This may serve as another expression of the prevailing belief that women, unlike men, must have unique and excessively abnormal reasons for committing what is deemed as a distinctly non-feminine act.

La force du Hezbollah, fondé en 1982 en pleine guerre civile, réside dans l’opacité qui structure ce parti. «La résistance islamique au Liban ne dispose pas de bases militaires, ni de casernes», affirmait son leader Hassan Nasrallah. Les effectifs de sa branche militaire ne sont pas connus. Son budget est tenu secret. Et le type d’armes dont il dispose n’est pas dévoilé. Ce mouvement politicoreligieux chiite est le produit d’un double mouvement identitaire et politique.

Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, prohibits the sale or license for export of certain defense articles or defense services to any country determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. The authority to make such determination has been delegated to the Secretary of State. This year the Secretary of State determined that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela demonstrated a near complete lack of cooperation with U.S. Government efforts to fight terrorism. This determination reflected a review of Venezuela’s overall actions against terrorism, the Venezuelan Government’s public statements in international fora addressing terrorism, Venezuela’s conduct toward terrorist organizations, and the Venezuelan Government’s relations with state sponsors of terror. On all fronts, the behavior of the Venezuelan Government is wanting.

“Here is the president of terror,” proclaims a Hizballah propaganda film montage on Al-Manar television, showing the face of President Bush alongside an American flag. As faces of dead and wounded children appear on the screen, crude pictures of bombs rain down on the pictures, all of them labeled “MADE IN AMERICA.”

In a July 17 article in Kayhan, a newspaper sponsored by Iran’s supreme leader, editor Hossein Shariatmadari wrote, “The Muslim nations should not let the engagement [with Israel] remain in its limited regional boundaries. The Zionists are scatted in many parts of the world and their identification is not that difficult. . . . Everywhere in the world must be made insecure for the Zionists.” Even without this exhortation from Iran, there is a real possibility that the conflict could expand beyond the borders of Lebanon and Israel. History has shown that Iran and Hizballah together have significant capabilities to conduct violent terrorist attacks anywhere in the world.

On April 28, 2006, the Department of State sent to Congress its annual report on global terrorism: Country Reports on Global Terrorism 2005. The 262-page report provides an annual strategic assessment of trends in terrorism and the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, coupled with detailed information on anti-terror cooperation by nations worldwide. The report and underlying data portray a threat from radical Jihadists that is becoming more widespread, diffuse, and increasingly homegrown, often with a lack of formal operational connection with al Qaeda ideological leaders such as Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri.

In the aftermath of September 11, many Americans have embraced the belief, or at least the hope, that acts of terror can be prevented in the future. More-advanced technologies, better-trained people, and better-organized bureaucracies, it is thought, will shield us from danger by revealing the future more clearly than America’s intelligence agencies were able to do before the Al Qaeda attacks.

Some years ago Samuel Huntington wrote: "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.... The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."

Is al-Qaida setting up a base in the Palestinian territories? Are Osama bin Laden's mujahedeen positioning themselves within easy striking distance of Israel? Both Israeli and Palestinian officials believe that to be the case. However Hamas, who recently won the elections and will form the next Cabinet, denies the presence of any al-Qaida operatives in the PA.

Al-Qaeda is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist network operating in over 60 countries around the world. At the center of the web is the core group, which I will refer to as Al-Qaeda Central (AQC), a disciplined, highly professional cadre of committed revolutionaries, which now probably consists of fewer than 1,000 dedicated members, and perhaps fewer than 500.

I will discuss: · Global jihadists, their fanatical ideology, and the civilized world’s efforts to disrupt, dismantle and destroy their networks; · The struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert their sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism; · WMD-related proliferation and two states of particular concern, Iran and North Korea; · Issues of political instability and governance in all regions of the world that affect our ability to protect and advance our interests; and · Globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and possible pandemics.

The pan-Arab TV station al-Jazeera has broadcast an audio tape purporting to be by al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, in which the speaker says al-Qaeda is preparing new attacks on the US.

There will be no end to terrorism while vile lies like this are perpetuated by radical Islam.

It was the main force behind the internationalization of suicide terrorism, transforming it from a local phenomenon to an international phenomenon. On an ideological level, al-Qaeda introduced the ideal of self-sacrifice,istishhad, as the jewel in the crown of global jihad, its leading organizational value, and became its own commercial symbol.

My dear brother, we are following your news, despite the difficulty and hardship. We received your last published message sent to Sheikh Usama Bin Ladin, God save him. Likewise, I made sure in my last speech-that Aljazeera broadcast Saturday, 11 Jumadi I, 1426h, 18 June 2005-to mention you, send you greetings, and show support and thanks for the heroic acts you are performing in defense of Islam and the Muslims, but I do not know what Aljazeera broadcast.

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was crafted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks after the insurance industry, stung by $32 billion in damage claims (by current estimates) and fearing another attack of equal magnitude, began to exclude terrorism coverage from policies. The legislation requires insurance companies to make terrorism insurance available to customers and, in return, provides federal reinsurance (a “backstop”) for losses from terrorist attacks. It is intended to give insurers time to assess their exposure to terrorism risk and to consider how to price and underwrite the risk. TRIA is set to expire at the end of December 2005.

Terrorism constitutes the main threat to security for democratic countries in the coming decades. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and those of 11 March 2004 in Spain serve to demonstrate that this threat, far from being either remote or imaginary, is real and present.

Since the beginning of the year Kuwait has had to deal with a renewed escalation of terrorism and has revealed radical Sunni Muslim cells whose members share Al-Qaeda's ideology.