There is general optimism about the future of the U.S.-ROK relationship, but its success depends on South Korea’s ability to develop and articulate a vision of its place in the region and the role the alliance will play in achieving that objective. The U.S. must be prepared to accept a mature and confident Seoul as a more equal partner.

North Korea’s economic collapse and famine in the 1990s and subsequent food shortages have prompted scores of thousands to seek refuge in China and beyond. The international community has failed to find an effective means of dealing with this situation.

Civil-military relations is one of the most challenging dimensions to deal with regarding North Korea. It is a topic that is difficult—if not impossible—to quantify with any real precision. Yet few subjects are more crucial to understanding that country. After all, since 1998, Pyongyang’s foremost policy has been declared as “military-first.” While experts debate the precise meaning and significance of this policy, considerable consensus exists that it gives the leading role to the Korean People’s Army (KPA)—as all services of the armed forces of North Korea collectively are known. Hence, military leaders in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are very powerful and influential figures. Who are they? What kind of power and influence do these leaders wield, and how do they exert it? How do KPA leaders interact with dictator Kim Jong Il and their civilian counterparts? Mr. Ken Gause sets out to answer these questions in this monograph.

The question I was asked to address is whether the U.S.–ROK alliance is at risk. The short answer is “yes,” but the reasons why and the ensuing prescriptions are far from simple. Thus, for the sake of efficiency and clarity, I will begin with my conclusion and then pro¬vide an explanation: The maintenance of a strong U.S.– ROK alliance is absolutely in the short-,mid-, and long-term strategic interests of the United States.

The United States’ policies toward North Korea attracted increased attention in the wake of North Korea’s missile testing on the 4th of July, 2006[1]—an occasion of obvious symbolic significance for Americans celebrating their Independence Day. That issue shall be addressed below as part of the broader evolution of U.S. relations with North Korea. The foreign and defense policies of the United States toward Korea today are increasingly complex in terms of U.S. national interests versus Korean national interests in that long divided nation.[2] To better understand the contextual legacy of those U.S. policies, it is worthwhile providing a brief overview of the historical setting which has shaped those policies.

Australia is a stakeholder in the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia. In 2005, the Northeast Asian region accounted for over 38 per cent of total Australian merchandise trade and over 45 per cent of Australian merchandise exports.3 Further, the economies of Australian trade partners—and consequently, demand for Australian goods—outside the immediate Northeast Asian region are, to a certain extent, dependent on stability within the region. Any conflict in the region would present a considerable challenge to the Australian economy.

North Korea's missile launches have posed a huge dilemma to South Korea as it pursues reconciliation and cooperation with its communist neighbor.

Adding an international relations angle to America’s Independence Day celebration, North Korea fired six missiles yesterday, and at least one more today, into the Sea of Japan. Among these missiles was the Taepodong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which failed approximately 40 seconds into its flight.

North Korea's missile launches are considered as part of its long-standing brinkmanship aimed at boosting its negotiation leverage with the United States by ratcheting up its security threats, officials and analysts in Seoul say.

It is no accident that North Korea has allowed U.S. intelligence to take note of its apparent preparations for firing a newer, longer range missile that might be capable of carrying nuclear warheads to U.S. soil.

As we went to press in the U.S. last night, morning was breaking at the Musudan-ri launch facility in the remote northeast of North Korea. It's possible we'll wake up to the news that Pyongyang has tested the long-range ballistic missile that is fully fueled and which U.S. satellites have monitored for more than a month.

North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.

It has been nine months since the fourth round of Six-Party Talks concluded with a joint statement of principles. Unfortunately that statement now appears to be the high-water mark of the six-party process rather than a baseline for future negotiations. Even if the prospects for near-term movement on the negotiating front appear slim, the process may still prove useful as a crisis management tool until negotiations are once again possible.

Reports from defectors and returned abductees have indicated that North Korea may be holding abductees from as many as twelve countries. The abduction of foreign citizens – and particularly of children – contravenes the most basic tenets of a civilized society.

North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute foreign policy problem for the United States.

China’s influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit but far less than outsiders tend to believe. Although it shares the international community’s denuclearisation goal, it has its own concept of how to achieve it.

Following is a text of the joint statement at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, as released in Beijing on September 19, 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Can the economic system of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be successfully reformed? That is to say: Is it possible for contemporary North Korea, with its autarkic, hypermilitarized, and ostensibly centrally planned economic structure to move toward and eventually embody an economic regimen akin to theones that have permitted so much material progress in East Asia’s two exemplars of “reform socialism”—China and Vietnam—over the past generation?