When the U.S. Air Force sent its proud F-15 fighter pilots against the Indian Air Force in the Cope India war games two years ago, it received a shock. The American pilots found themselves technologically outmatched by nimbler warplanes; tactically outsmarted by the Indian mix of high, low, and converging attack waves; and outfought by the Indians, whose highly trained pilots average more than 180 flying hours a year—roughly the same as their U.S. and Israeli counterparts and slightly more than those of NATO allies such as France and Germany.

Indian defense minister Pranab Mukherjee's recent visit to Japan, China and Singapore indicates the emergence of a creative regional security strategy that boosts New Delhi's global image, Indian defense analysts said Tuesday.

If Congress does not approve the U.S.-India nuclear deal, “it would have a real and negative effect on the bilateral relationship,” concludes a new Council Special Report. Congress should adopt a two-stage approach, formally endorsing the deal’s basic framework, while delaying final approval until it is assured that critical nonproliferation needs are met. “Patience and a few simple fixes would address major proliferation concerns while ultimately strengthening the strategic partnership,” says the report.

The argument for overcoming the nuclear impasse with India – for altering the nuclear status quo that cut India off from international civil nuclear cooperation for over 30 years – has become increasingly persuasive. It has been clear for many years that maintaining existing U.S. laws and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines prohibiting such cooperation would not succeed in inducing New Delhi to join the NPT or give up nuclear weapons.

This is obviously a complex subject with different facets stretching from the political to the technical. It is also a subject I have given some thought to and have written about in the past. As requested in your letter, I will focus my oral and written remarks this morning mainly on the strategic logic underlying the President’s initiative on civil nuclear cooperation and its importance for the transforming U.S.-Indian relationship. I will be happy, however, to cover those aspects that I have not touched on in my formal testimony during the discussion that follows. I respectfully request that my statement be entered into the record.

In this brief statement, I wish to make only three points. The first is that those who advocate making this special arrangements to permit nuclear cooperation with India ought to be clear -and honest- about why they are doing so.

Recent years, however, have witnessed a sea change in bilateral relations, with more positive interactions becoming the norm. India’s swift offer of full support for U.S.-led counterterrorism operations after September 2001 was widely viewed as reflective of such change. Today, President Bush calls India a “natural partner” of the United States and his Administration seeks to assist India’s rise as a major power in the new century.

India's relationship with the United States has always been the subject of debate and discussion. Despite being the world’s largest democracy, India could never enjoy a smooth and noncontroversial relationship with the world's oldest democracy—which means that sharing the same value system will not act as a glue to hold states together in the international politics. Until recently, India and the United States, due to their multifarious differences, were considered to be ‘estranged democracies’—but their recent agreement on civil nuclear technology has transformed their relationship, and made them ‘engaged democracies.’

According to some people, including former president Bill Clinton, South Asia is the most dangerous place on earth. Certainly there is the possibility of conflict, but actually, the region is by no means the most dangerous place on earth. Indeed, during Clinton’s tenure in office, Rwanda was much more dangerous, if one looks at the sheer number of people who were killed (by machetes, not nuclear weapons).

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the creation of a “global partnership,” which would include “full” civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Such cooperation would reverse almost 30 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Our agreement with India will make our future more secure, by expanding the reach of the international nonproliferation regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency would gain access to India's civilian nuclear program that it currently does not have.

President George W. Bush's visit to India has brought relations between the United States and India to an unprecedented level of cooperation and interdependence.

The main price to be paid will be the separate international diplomatic effort to constrain Iran's nuclear development program, since the India deal sets a precedent that drives a coach and horses through the existing system of international legal controls over nuclear proliferation.

The civilian nuclear deal signed Thursday between India and the United States will yield benefits for both countries and allow New Delhi to plug into a once restricted world of nuclear commerce, Indian foreign affairs analysts said Friday.

Critics of the Bush Administration often lament that its policies have alienated America's traditional allies and embittered just about everyone else. Everyone except, apparently, a billion or so Indians.

On the eve of President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, I was asked by the White House to prepare a brief paper outlining the purpose of the trip and the new vision the US envisioned in its relations with India.

That marks an abrupt reversal of nearly three decades of U.S. nuclear policy. If approved by Congress the agreement would allow companies in the U.S. and elsewhere to provide India with nuclear technology even though the country hasn't signed a key nuclear disarmament pact.

The end of the Cold War freed India-U.S. relations from the constraints of global bipolarity, but interactions continued for a decade to be affected by the burden of history, most notably the longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry and nuclear weapons proliferation in the region.

Both our countries are linked by a deep commitment to freedom and democracy; a celebration of national diversity, human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide; and a desire to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

When President Bush visits India next month, he will see a country that is making remarkable economic progress despite enormous structural problems. That progress will, however, be far less visible than it is in China. In India he will not see the modern high-rises or the general level of prosperity that he has seen in urban China. But the progress in India is nevertheless real.

Combined with the Bush administration’s visible push to strengthen Japan’s hand in managing Asian security, the Indian prime minister’s visit to Washington cemented a growing de facto strategic partnership between the United States and India.

The numerous controversies that swirled around the administration’s handling of Iraq during George W. Bush’s first term obscured a strategic success with major implications for the future balance of power in Asia: the transformation of relations between the United States and India.

Nonproliferation advocates in Washington argue that recent U.S. efforts extending civilian nuclear cooperation with India would undercut global nonproliferation. One argument is that many states like Japan and Brazil either had nuclear bombs or the ability to make them but gave up that ability in return for the civilian nuclear cooperation guaranteed by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Most EU governments take very little interest in India. That is likely to change. According to Goldman Sachs' research, over the next half century India will grow faster than any other large national economy. By 2050 it will be the world's third largest, behind China and the US - but around four times bigger than each of the next three, Japan, Brazil and Russia.

It is an awkward time for India to be without a foreign minister. Amid crucial negotiations designed to forge new ties with the United States and Pakistan, the country suddenly finds itself with no minister to guide the process.

The two sides reviewed the friendly contacts and progress in their bilateral relations in recent years and agreed that India-China relations have entered a new stage of comprehensive development.